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INTRODUCTION
Litigation finance “is likely the most important development in civil justice in our time.”1 So
what is litigation finance? It is “financial assistance to persons or companies involved as plaintiffs in
civil suits.”2 In the world of litigation finance, there are broadly two forms of third-party litigation
funding (TPLF), (1) commercial litigation funding and (2) consumer litigation funding. 3 Commercial
litigation funding, “is the territory of large litigation funding companies (LFCs)” which fund large-scale
lawsuits (or a portfolio of cases) in exchange for a share of the recovery.4 By contrast consumer
litigation funding, is usually funded by smaller LFCs which “provide[] individuals with cash advances
on a non-recourse, fixed interest basis to pay for living expenses during the claim pursuit.” 5 Generally,

1
Maya Steinitz, Following the Money? A Proposed Approach for Disclosure of Litigation Finance Agreements, 53
U.C., DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1075 (2019).
2 Charles Silver, Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the Difference?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 617, 619
(2014).
3 SWISS RE INSTITUTE, US LITIGATION FUNDING AND SOCIAL INFLATION 5 (2021).
4 Id.
5 Id.
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consumer litigation funding cases relate to relatively small personal injury suits, and within that
category mostly motor vehicle accident cases.6
Commercial and consumer TPLF “share the same legal DNA” in that both are contingent on
the outcome of the litigation. They diverge however, in that commercial products usually entitle the
funder “to a portion of the client’s recovery or . . . a multiple of initial advance” while consumer
funding agreements are “loan-like,” using interest rates and behave like “a subprime debt product.” 7
There are a wide variety of legal issues in both the commercial and consumer litigation arenas.
In the commercial litigation space, concerns largely come from the Chamber of Commerce (and their
allies), seeking to diminish the ability of commercial actors to sue large corporations. 8 These concerns
have led to calls for greater disclosure of the existence of TPLF and the actual funding agreements.9
By contrast, the legal concerns and discussions surrounding consumer litigation funding largely
revolve around protecting consumers from predatory lending practices,10 at least superficially, similar
to issues present in the payday lending space.11 That is, consumers often pay extremely high interest
rates, that might be considered usurious if legally considered a loan and purportedly “often leaves
[consumers] with almost nothing from the award or settlement.”12

Ronen Avraham & Anthony J. Sebok, An Empirical Investigation of Third Party Consumer Litigation Funding, 104
CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1147 (2019) (showing that 59% of all cases funded by a consumer litigation funder were in motor
vehicle accidents).
7 Id. at 1168.
8 Suneal Bedi & William C. Marra, The Shadows of Litigation Finance, 74 VAND. L. REV. 563, 580-81 (2021)
(emphasizing the Chamber of Commerce’s concern with “frivolous litigation because there may be circumstances where a
claimholder is unwilling to risk her own capital to self finance a case . . . .”).
9 See Steinitz, supra note 1 at 1076-1077.
10 This is not to say that the Chamber of Commerce does not view consumer litigation funding as adverse to their
interests, but only that much of the focus of reforms has been to protect consumers rather than to protect defendants.
This is likely the result of two important factors. Firstly, consumer litigation is generally funding relatively small amounts of
money to litigants. Paige Marta Skiba & Jean Xiao, Consumer Litigation Funding: Just Another Form of Payday Lending?, 80
L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBS. 117, 122 (2017). Additionally, the funding is not tied to actually to funding the litigation and
proceeds are generally used for general living expenses. Id. at 126.
11 Id. at 120-26 (discussing similarities and differences with consumer litigation funding and payday lending).
12 Ronen Avraham & Anthony J. Sebok, An Empirical Investigation of Third Party Consumer Litigation Funding,
104 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1137 (2019).
6
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This paper will focus on the issues relating to consumer litigation funding. This paper will offer
two potential reforms in furtherance of protecting consumers from predatory lending practices, while
still maintaining the practice without banning or capping interest rates in the industry.13 Proposal I
advocates for a uniform statute disallowing compounding interest, interest buckets, and interest
accruing upfront fees. Additionally, consumer LFCs will be required to present clear and coherent
disclosures that are modeled upon those enacted in Vermont, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Ohio, and Maine
that require a clearly outlined schedule of the amount due at monthly intervals 14 throughout the
repayment period. This paper does not advocate for disallowing minimum interest periods because
effective disclosures can sufficiently inform consumers of the minimum payment due once the
recission period has ended. Minimum interest periods reasonably allow LFCs to cover the cost of
underwriting the funding opportunities without charging upfront fees.
Proposal II proposes enacting legislation that requires LFCs to predict the amount of the
judgment or settlement and the amount of time it will take to reach such settlement or judgment. 15
Moreover, LFCs will also be required to predict the total legal costs due to the plaintiff’s counsel which
will likely include a contingency fee and legal costs. The funder will then provide the plaintiff with an
Estimated Total Recovery Amount, reflecting the plaintiff’s “take-home” amount. 16 Finally, if the
actual Total Recovery is lower than originally assessed, the plaintiff, with the advice of counsel shall
be entitled to enter into mediation to reduce the fee owed to the LFC. Although LFCs may oppose
such reductions, research has shown that LFCs consistently take haircuts from the amount technically

13 See Skiba, supra note 10 at 130-34 (explaining why bans and loan restrictive regulations would not be
beneficial for consumers in the consumer litigation funding industry).
14 Under the law currently in the aforementioned states, the payment schedule only requires payment at sixmonth intervals. It would likely be more beneficial for borrowers to have a payment schedule with payments at monthly
intervals.
15 Skiba, supra note 10, similarly advocates for requiring LFCs to make an estimate of payment amount and
timing but does not advocate for an effective enforcement mechanism to induce LFCs to make accurate predictions.
16 See infra, Table 2.
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due on funding, so such a proposal will ensure that such haircuts are actually directed towards those
consumers that have not been accurately informed of the cost of borrowing.
I.

Current or Pending Legislation

Currently, there are two types of legislative/regulatory reforms that have been enacted (or
are being contemplated) in the consumer litigation field. The first form seeks to address the
transparency issue through disclosure requirements—to protect consumers from complicated,
unclear, and opaque agreements. The second form seeks to set caps on interest rates/fees or formally
restrict loan characteristics. The latter reforms are considered to be supported by the “tort reform”
lobby that seeks to curtail the availability of such funding—essentially creating restrictive rules to
price LFCs out of the market.17
A. Disclosure Enactments
Vermont has enacted quite robust disclosure requirements. The statute requires litigation
funding agreements to include (1) a description of possible alternatives to litigation funding contract;
(2) a consumer’s right to rescind the agreement within five business days if the plaintiff returns the
funds provided by the LFC; (3) an APR disclosure; (4) an itemization of all charges associated with the
agreement; (5) schedule of repayments if repayment is made any time after the funding contract is
executed;18 and (6) the contract must be written “in a clear and coherent manner using words with
common, everyday meanings.”19 Maine, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Ohio have similarly robust
disclosure requirements.20
B. Caps on Interest Rates & Restrictions of Loan Characteristics

Avraham, supra note 12 at 1139.
Though not explicit in the Vermont statute, other states seem to require payment schedules based on sixmonth intervals, though based on later discussion with Interest Buckets, Vermont might be attempting to address
concerns about smaller intervals.
19 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2253 (2016).
20 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A § 12-104 (2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-805 (2013) (does not have APR
disclosure requirement); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-3303 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (2008).
17
18
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Arkansas has enacted legislation capping interest rates on litigation funding agreements at
17% per year.21 States like Indiana and Tennessee have also enacted statutes capping litigation
interest charges at approximately 36% per annum.22 New York is currently considering legislation that
would cap litigation funding interest rates at 36%.23 Scholars and LFCs have said that such caps and
restrictions on loan characteristics will force LFCs to exit such markets because of their inability to
remain profitable.24 Such exits are considered a victory for the insurance industry, but likely harm lowincome consumers the most, who may be forced to “resort to payday lending or other forms of more
costly capital.”25
II.

Proposal I

Congress should enact specific legislation aimed at creating greater transparency in consumer
litigation funding that is analogous to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), but goes further in (1)
disallowing minimum interest periods, interest buckets, and interest on upfront fees, which
essentially requires funders to build all of their intended return into the “as advertised” interest rate
(2) requiring a payment schedule on a monthly basis, and (3) granting consumers the ability to rescind
the agreement within five business days of the funding. TILA is a federal law passed in 1968 to protect
consumers from unfair lending practices.26 Essentially, it is national standard for commercial lending
that requires lenders to provide adequate disclosures to consumers in the true cost of borrowing
capital.27 The requirements include “(1) minimum font size (2) itemization of one-time fees (3)

See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-57-109(b)(1), 4-57-104 (2017); ARK. CONST. amend. 89, § 3.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-16-110 (2020) (capping interest rate at 36% and disallowing terms greater than three
years); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-12-4.5-2 (2019) (capping interest rate at 36% per annum).
23 Litigation Funding May Soon Be Addressed by New York’s Legislature, THE NATIONAL REVIEW (Nov. 20, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/litigation-funding-may-soon-be-addressed-new-york-s-legislature.
24 See Andrew G. Simpson, Litigation Financing Firm Exits Tennessee as New Law Goes into Effect, INSURANCE
JOURNAL (July 3, 2014), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2014/07/03/333772.htm; Skiba, supra note 10
at 132-34 (describing how setting interest rates too low harms consumers and forces LFCs to exit markets).
25 Skiba, supra note 10 at 133.
26 Truth in Lending Act – Consumer Rights and Protections, DEBT.ORG (last updated Dec. 16, 2021)
https://www.debt.org/credit/your-consumer-rights/truth-lending-act/.
27 Id.
21
22
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provision of schedule of payments, and (4) disclosure of the APR.”28 Payday loans are subject to TILA,
yet it does not ostensibly apply to legal finance because LFCs are not technically classified as
“creditors” under the Act.29 As Skiba and Xiao note, simply applying TILA to consumer litigation finance
context30 would fail to meet the needs of consumers in this space.31
Firstly, from a behavioral economic perspective, consumers generally lack the capacity to
appropriately mentally account for the price of immediate funding attached to the indeterminate
results of their lawsuit.32 “Research has shown that customers do not heed certain components of
price and thus underestimate price if these components are not salient.” 33 As Skiba and Xiao explain,
generally, commercial loans are paid from an individual’s future income or paychecks, while litigation
funding repayment comes out of a future judgment or settlement payment making it inherently
opaque because the consumer can’t accurately predict the timing or the amount she will receive.34
Research has shown that the inability to accurately mentally account results in consumers being
unable to effectively determine whether the funding is actually worthwhile and cost-efficient.35 The
result is that consumers often don’t fully account for the true cost of accepting a consumer litigation
finance agreement.
Secondly, it is unclear whether TILA would effectively protect consumers from (1)
compounding interest (2) interest buckets, and (3) upfront fees36 that accrue interest until repayment.
Avraham and Sebok’s research (the “LFC Study”) of “one of the largest consumer litigation financing
firms in the United States” with a dataset of approximately 200,000 funded and unfunded cases over

Skiba, supra note 10 at 135.
Id.
30 Contrary to the law in most states, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that litigation finance agreements are
loans and would therefore be governed by TILA. Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400 (Colo. 2015).
31 Skiba, supra note 10 at 135.
32 Id. at 127.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 127-128.
35 Id. at 128-129
36 Such fees are inaccurately characterized as upfront fees because they are in fact charged at the end, and the
funder charges interest on those fees even though no such funds are distributed to the consumer.
28
29
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a ten-year period show that consumer litigation funding firms make a significant portion of their fees
using these complex financial structures.37
Compounding interest is the financial structure in which during a set period the interest is
calculated and added to outstanding balance so that in the following period the borrower is charged
interest on the principal and the accrued interest. For example, a loan of $500 with a 3% per month
interest rate, which uses simple interest (non-compounding) would result in the borrower owing $680
(3%*12=36%) after one year. By contrast, if interest was compounded monthly, then the borrower
would owe $712.88 (500*(1+.03)^12=$712.88), which is an effective interest rate of 42.4%. While the
LFC advertises a rate of 3% per month, during a single year, the consumer actually pays almost 4% per
month on the amount funded.38 According to the LFC Study, 88% of all completed cases had monthly
compounding interest.39
Minimum Interest Periods are a set of intervals at which a borrower must pay back the
interest that would have accrued for an entire period whether or not that time has actually elapsed. 40
For example, using the same loan terms as previously discussed, with a loan of $500 and a monthly
interest rate of 3% and we assume the loan has an MIP of six months, then the borrower must pay
back $590 (3%*6 months)41 even if the borrower pays back the loan after only two months. Without
the MIP, she would only be required to pay $530. Similarly, Interest Buckets create periods upon
which interest is required to be paid when payment is made at any time during the period, even if
that time has not elapsed. For example, if the aforementioned litigation agreement has six-month
interest buckets, then if repayment is made in the seventh month, then the consumer must pay $680
(3%*12) instead of only $605 (3%*7). Essentially, IBs create minimum interest periods throughout the

Avraham, supra note 12.
See infra, Table 1.
39 Avraham, supra note 12 at 1151.
40 Id. at 1152.
41 Using simple interest instead of compounding.
37
38
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term of the loan. Almost 90% of all the 200,00 cases in the LFC Study had an MIP and an IB of three
months.42
Finally, consumer LFCs used interest bearing processing or application fees which were to be
paid ex post upon successful recovery.43 In the LFC Study 54% of completed cases had $250 processing
fee, while 24% were set at $350 for a single request.44 Those numbers might not superficially seem so
egregious, but the LFC Study shows that because the fees were interesting bearing and the fees were
often tied to the amount funded, advertised interest rates of 36% (3% monthly) could turn into over
90% when IBs, MIP, and fees were added to the funding agreement.45
Avraham and Sebok have argued that compounding interest, MIPs, IBs, and interest-bearing
upfront fees should be outright prohibited because they could find no economic rationale for not
building those fees into an increased simple interest rate.46 That is, there is no justification for
embedding these financial structures into to the agreements except to make the financial
arrangement opaque and more difficult for the consumer to understand.47 I agree with Avraham and
Sebok’s contention that compounding interest, IBs, and interest-bearing upfront fees should be
prohibited, but I don’t think that MIPs should be prohibited.
Compounding interest could essentially be captured by raising the simple interest rate.
Instead of charging 3% monthly compounding (yearly $712), they can charge 3.5% non-compounding
(yearly $710).48 Unsophisticated borrowers can more easily calculate a non-compounding interest
than compounding. This is especially important because as noted, plaintiffs are especially prone to
improper mental accounting.49 Moreover, as will be discussed in Part II, during the underwriting

Avraham, supra note 12 at 1153.
Id. at 1154-56.
44 Id. at 1155.
45 Id. at 1156.
46 Id. at 1173-74.
47 Id.
48 See infra, Table 1.
49 Skiba, supra note 10 at 128-29.
42
43
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process LFCs will predict the timing of the judgment or settlement,50 so disallowing compounding
interest does not disadvantage funders from a financial perspective because based on the projected
length of the case the LFCs can calculate their expected return using a more transparent and easily
understood metric—simple interest rates.
LFCs will likely counter that doing so isn’t necessarily beneficial for the consumer because
while the higher simple interest rate and compounding rate have approximately the same amount
due at the end of the year, the higher simple rate actually has higher payments at any point before
month 11 in a single year.51 But that argument misses the point. The most critical concern in consumer
litigation finance is lack of transparency and the inability for consumers to effectively mentally
account. A consumer’s ability to easily account, using basic mathematics for the amount she will owe
at any given point is fundamental. The consumer can then decide, meaningfully, if she wants to
proceed with a full understanding of what she will owe.
Similarly, IBs and interesting bearing upfront fees seem to be implemented to obscure the
actual cost of the loan to the consumer instead of implementing the cost through a simple interest
rate. Interest Buckets give LFCs an upcharge for a particular period even though their capital has been
recouped. Upfront fees are almost certainly intended to obscure the true cost of borrowing because
LFCs can just as easily “charge”52 those fees with an increased interest rate.
As it relates to MIPs, I respectfully disagree with Avraham and Sebok and believe that there is
a reasonable economic justification for allowing MIPs. As noted, MIPs require a borrower to pay back
a minimum amount of interest for their advance even if the settlement or judgment occurs earlier
than the MIP. LFCs outlay significant capital to underwrite the applications for funding and while

See infra, note 56.
See infra, Table 1.
52 If LFCs intention in charging upfront fees was to actually defray the cost of underwriting the litigation, then
those charges should actually be charged upfront to both funded and unfunded cases. See Avraham, supra note 12 at
1154-55.
50
51
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increased interest rates can be used to defray the cost of overhead, if the funding is paid out “too
early,” then funders can’t effectively cover the cost of overhead and capital. Moreover, there is an
effective way to inform consumers without obscurity. Funders should be required to include in their
disclosure the minimum required payment after the recission period, which effectively captures the
MIP.53 Using that information together with the payment schedule, consumers are not being baited
into accepting funding, but can effectively assess the true cost of the funding in any alternative.
III.

Proposal II

Congress or state legislatures should adopt legislation that would require LFCs to (1) predict
the (a) amount and (b) timing of the settlement or judgment, (2) disclose the amount due to plaintiff’s
lawyer under the contingency agreement and estimate the legal costs not included in the attorney’s
fee, (3) outline in clear and easily understood terms the actual amount the plaintiff will receive upon
settlement or judgment (Total Recovery Amount), and (4) require LFCs to agree to enter into
mediation to negotiate a reduction of the amount due if the estimated recovery is less than predicted
in the LFC disclosure. Although Proposal I would inform consumers more meaningfully in the actual
cost of borrowing and would protect consumers from complex financial structures that appear to be
employed for the sole purpose of obscuring the actual borrowing costs, it is not sufficient. Because of
the uncertainty in (1) the amount and (2) timing of judgment/settlement to be received, Proposal I
alone, fails to allow consumers to effectively assess the cost and relative benefit of accepting the
funding. Skiba and Xiao explain that because of this uncertainty and lack of salience, consumers fail
to appropriately account for the actual cost of borrowing.54 Skiba and Xiao therefore argue that
“funder[s] should give the plaintiff an estimate of how much he will owe and when the amount owed
will be due.”55 For example, if an LFC predicts that a particular case will settle in fourteen months for

See infra, Table 2, “Payment Schedule.”
Skiba, supra note 10 at 128-129.
55 Id. at 135.
53
54
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$100,000 and is willing to fund $7,000 at 3% per month56 the funder will be required to inform the
plaintiff that under the terms of the agreement, she will likely owe $9,940 ($7,000 principal and
$2,940 of interest), so the plaintiff we be informed that she will only recover $90,160. Skiba and Xiao’s
proposal is a good start, but it isn’t adequate.
Firstly, plaintiffs in the personal injury space often pay their legal counsel through a
contingency fee. If we assume the plaintiff’s lawyer takes a 33% contingency fee57 the plaintiff’s
actually recovery is $60,060. But that’s not all. Plaintiff’s lawyers often take legal costs and expenses
off the top of the recovery which can be as high as 30% of the recovery, but we’ll assume 10%. 58
Plaintiff’s recovery now drops to $47,060.59
Secondly, and more importantly, there’s no apparent enforcement mechanism or incentive
for the LFC to accurately predict the timing and amount of recovery. Essentially, LFCs are incentivized
to underpredict the amount of time it will take to settle and overestimate the recovery, to “pad”
plaintiff’s estimated recovery, so the plaintiff is inclined to accept the funding.
This paper therefore advocates for requiring LFCs to include the contingency fee percentage
(with a calculated contingency amount on the Estimated Settlement/Judgment Amount), the
projected legal costs, and a total estimated recovery to the plaintiff.60 Also to the extent applicable in
a particular jurisdiction, LFC disclosures should inform plaintiffs of the potential subrogation rights by
first-party insurers that may claw back some of the judgment/settlement for costs that have been

56 I use this settlement period, interest rate, and amount of willingness to fund because according to the LFC
Study, (1) the median period from funding to settlement was 14 months; (2) the median interest rate was 3%, and the
average amount funded relative to the settlement was 7%. Avraham, supra note 12 at 1141.
57 Research has shown that this is the approximate amount contingency fee lawyers take for representation in
personal injury cases. Martin Nolo Research, How Much Does a Personal Injury Lawyer Charge?, LAWYERS.COM (updated
Sept. 12, 2016) https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/personal-injury/average-compensation-and-duration/how-muchdoes-a-personal-injury-charge.html
58 David Goguen, Lawyers’ Fees in Your Personal Injury Case, ALLLAW,
https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/lawyers-fees.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2022)
59 See infra, Table 2.
60 Table 2.
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outlaid.61 Then after breaking down the various costs and expenses, the LFC should provide a final
“Total Estimated Recovery”—which would provide the plaintiff with an estimate of her “take home”
amount.62 These disclosures and estimations serve the same function as Skiba and Xiao’s proposal—
increasing the saliency of the loss of paying out fees from a judgment or settlement. 63 By disclosing
and estimating other costs and fees that the plaintiff will have to pay before paying off the funding,
the plaintiff can accurately assess her actual recovery and the loss associated with the various fees
and expenses that will be incurred on that future (potential) cash flow.
While such disclosures will help the plaintiff engage with the saliency of the future income by
giving her an estimated judgment/settlement recovery and the cost/loss, by estimating the LFC and
legal expenses, the proposal still does not address enforcement and incentivization for accurate
predicting. Therefore, LFCs shall be required to engage in mandatory mediation with the plaintiff to
negotiate a reduction in the amount owed to them if the LFC overpredicts the Total Estimated
Recovery of the plaintiff. Using this mechanism, LFCs are incentivized to predict lower Total Estimated
Recoveries, through more conservative and less aggressive underwriting. LFCs are still incentivized
not to aggressively underpredict the Total Recovery because plaintiffs will be unlikely to accept
funding if their Total Recovery is paltry or unbalanced in relation to the Settlement/Judgment
Amount.
Although the idea of renegotiation of the terms of an executed agreement might seem
implausible, highly impractical, and likely to cause LFCs to leave the market entirely, the practice of
reducing an amount owed to an LFC ex post is referred to as a “haircut” and is far more common than

61 Relevant issues include: (1) subrogation rights of insurers, (2) whether the case resulted in judgment or
settlement, and (3) whether the jurisdiction employs a “Made Whole Rule” or a Priority Rule. This paper does not advocate
for placing the burden of assessing those issues on the LFC, but only that the LFC should advise the plaintiff of those issues
in clear and easily understood language.
62 Table 2.
63 See Skiba, supra note 10 at 128-129 (explaining loss aversion and disutility as it relates to payday loans and
generic commercial loan products)
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many commentators expect.64 The LFC Study showed that in more than 50% of the funded cases in
which the LFC was able to collect a profit (the principal component plus a premium), the LFC accepted
an amount less than the contractually required amount due to the funder.65 In only 34% of all funded
cases did the plaintiff actually pay the amount due based on the funding agreement.66 It is apparent
that LFCs willingly agreed to accept a lower amount due to them in negotiation with the plaintiff.
Although it’s possible that in some of those cases the plaintiff’s positive recovery was sufficient to pay
back the principal and some premium, but not enough to cover the entire premium, it is highly unlikely
that in all of those cases that was the case.67 The more “likely explanation is that, although the client
received sufficient net proceeds . . . to cover the amount due, the proceeds were less than she and
her lawyer anticipated, and therefore the funder voluntarily agreed to forego its legal right to full
payment of the amount due.”68
So, then the question is whether LFCs would provide haircuts even if there wasn’t mandatory
mediation for plaintiffs that received a lower amount than initially estimated. The LFC Study seems to
indicate that clients of law firms that sent significant business to the LFC were more likely to receive
haircuts.69 The evidence shows that plaintiffs represented by law firms that were repeat “megaplayers”—that is, firms that represented clients that accepted funding in more than 1,000 cases,
received haircuts in 59% of their cases, compared to in only 48% of cases for regular repeat players
and one-timers.70 That differential might not seem so superficially stark, but as Avraham and Sebok
note, the numbers are in fact more consequential because the median embedded interest rate for
mega-players’ clients was only 62% as compared to 113% for one-timers and 133% for regular repeat

Avraham, supra note 12 at 1143.
Id. at 1157.
66 Id. at 1158.
67 Id.
68 Id. (emphasis added).
69 Id. at 1163-64.
70 Id. at 1164.
64
65
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players’ clients.71 There was far less room for the funders to provide a haircut to mega-player’s clients
and yet their clients still received a haircut far more often than non-mega-player clients.72 The
takeaway is obvious. Funders were far more willing to give haircuts to mega-player clients because
their negotiating counterparty was likely to provide more business and funders were less inclined to
provide such discounts to clients of non-repeat players.
Requiring funders to estimate the actual total recovery to all clients and then mandating
mediation for clients that receive less than estimated, evens the playing field because all plaintiffs will
have the opportunity negotiate a haircut when their recovery is less than expected. Getting all
plaintiffs that receive funding and receive an amount less than anticipated, to the negotiating table is
an important step in creating greater transparency and equality in the consumer litigation funding
space.
CONCLUSION
This paper’s proposals attempt to create more transparency and equity in consumer litigation
funding. Proposal I would disallow funders from using complex and likely intentionally obscure
financial structures to undercut plaintiffs’ ability to understand the true cost of accepting funding. By
requiring funders to use (1) simple interest rates without interest buckets or interest accruing fees
and (2) mandating clear and coherent disclosures and payment schedules (modeled upon those
enacted in Vermont, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Ohio, and Maine), plaintiffs can more accurately and
saliently understand the benefit-disutility of accepting funds.
Proposal II would require funders to disclose (1) an estimated recovery amount from the
judgment or settlement, (2) an estimated recovery time, (3) the estimated amount due to plaintiff’s
legal counsel (for both the contingency fee and legal costs), and (4) most critically an Estimated Total

71
72

Id. at 1163.
Id.
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Recovery that the plaintiff will receive after paying off all the necessary expenses. The proposal then
requires funders to engage in mediation with the plaintiff’s legal counsel to negotiate a haircut of the
amount due if the Total Recovery is less than the estimated amount. This serves an effective
enforcement mechanism inducing funders to conservatively predict Total Recoveries, while the
funders are still disinclined to underpredict because clients will then be disincentivized from accepting
funding. These proposals are a meaningful step towards creating greater transparency, fairness, and
equity in consumer litigation funding.
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Table 1
Due @
12mo.

Months
Borrowed

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

3%

$500

$515.00

$530.00

$545.00

$560.00

$575.00

$590.00

$605.00

$620.00

$635.00

$650.00

$665.00

$680.00

3.50%

$500

$517.50

$535.00

$552.50

$570.00

$587.50

$605.00

$622.50

$640.00

$657.50

$675.00

$692.50

$710.00

Compounding

3%

$500

$515.00

$530.45

$546.36

$562.75

$579.64

$597.03

$614.94

$633.39

$652.39

$671.96

$692.12

$712.88

Compounding

3.50%

$500

$517.50

$535.61

$554.36

$573.76

$593.84

$614.63

$636.14

$658.40

$681.45

$705.30

$729.98

$755.53

NonCompounding
NonCompounding

Rate
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Table 2

Amount Borrowed
Monthly Interest Rate
Minimum Amount Due
Estimated Recovery Time
Est. Settlement/Judgment Amnt.
Estimated Amount Due to LFC
Legal Contingency Fee
Legal Fees

Estimated Total Recovery

Amount
$7,000
3%
$8,260
14 months
$100,000
$9,940
$33,000
$10,000

Calculation

$7000*3%*6MO.+Principal

$7000*3%*14MO.+Principal
Assume 33%
Assume 10%

$47,060

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

$8,260
$8,260
$8,260
$8,260
$8,260
$8,260
$8,470.00
$8,680.00
$8,890.00
$9,100.00
$9,310.00
$9,520.00
$9,730.00
$9,940.00
$10,150.00
$10,360.00
$10,570.00
$10,780.00

Monthly Payment Schedule
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
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$10,990.00
$11,200.00
$11,410.00
$11,620.00
$11,830.00
$12,040.00
$12,250.00
$12,460.00
$12,670.00
$12,880.00
$13,090.00
$13,300.00
$13,510.00
$13,720.00
$13,930.00
$14,140.00
$14,350.00
$14,560.00

